On the Brink: The First Amendment in the Rehnquist Court, 1990-91 Term by Gora, Joel
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
1992
On the Brink: The First Amendment in the
Rehnquist Court, 1990-91 Term
Joel Gora
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, First Amendment Commons, and
the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
9 Touro L. Rev. 111 (1992)
ON THBE BIN~hK: THE FIR 1ST A1XMEND1VIENT
IN THE REHNQUIST COURT, 1990-91 TERM
Hon. Leon Lazer:
Our next speaker is very prominent in the field of First
Amendment jurisprudence. I am referring, of course, to Profes-
sor Joel Gora of Brooklyn Law School. He is a graduate of Co-
lumbia Law School and was a Pro Se Clerk for the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. From 1969 to 1978, Professor Gora
served as Staff Counsel for the ACLU and he presently serves as
General Counsel for the New York ACLU.
Professor Joel M. Gora:*
We United States Supreme Court watchers, particularly those
of us who came of constitutional age during the liberal Warren
Court era,1 tend to get a little overheated when assessing the
current Supreme Court's handiwork, especially in the First
Amendment area. Ever since the beginning of the Burger Court
era,2 we have been sure that each year would be a "disaster" for
constitutional rights and particularly the freedoms of speech and
press. Well, the Burger Court turned out not to be so bad, a
prominent book of essays once described that Court's "era as "the
counterrevolution that wasn't." 3 But with the commencement of
the Reagan/Rehnquist Court in the 1980's, we have been peren-
nially certain we will not be disappointed in our glum expecta-
tions. This year, finally, Chicken Little may be right: the First
Amendment sky may be falling. A little bit.
This year's ABA Journal roundup of the First Amendment
docket of the Court was entitled: "Skeptical About Speech." 4 In-
* Professor Gora would like to acknowledge that work on this article
was supported by the Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Stipend Fund.
1. Chief Justice Warren presided from 1953-1969.
2. Chief Justice Burger presided from 1969-1986.
3. VINCENT BLASI, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION
THAT WASN'T (ed. 1983).
4. David 0. Stewart, Skeptical About Speedi, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at
50-52.
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deed, the Court was. Likewise, a recent issue of Human Rights
was devoted to the topic: "The Diminishing of the First Amend-
ment," 5 and, indeed, the First Amendment may be. We may now
truly be at a watershed moment in the history of First
Amendment law. Free speech rights, which flourished in the
Warren and Burger Court eras, 6 are under siege on a number of
fronts. Sexual speech has been attacked by puritans on the right
5. HUMAN RIGHTS, Fall 1991, Vol. 18, No. 3.
6. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg, a Ku
Klux Klan leader was convicted of violating an Ohio statute outlawing the
advocacy of sabotage, violence and terrorism for the purpose of bringing about
political change. Id. at 444-45. The Supreme Court held the state statute in
contravention of the First and Fourteenth Amendments on the grounds that a
state may only prohibit free speech advocating the use of force where it is di-
rected at, and likely to produce, lawless action. Id. at 449. In Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, a draft opponent was given a thirty day jail sentence for violating a
California disturbing the peace statute when he wore a jacket bearing expletive
language in a municipal courthouse. 403 U.S. at 16. The Supreme Court held
that the state could not make a public display of expletive language a criminal
offense, reasoning that there was a significant likelihood of unconstitutionally
suppressing ideas in the process, id. at 21, and that anyone who was offended
could always avert their eyes. Id. at 26. In Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robbins, the Supreme Court held that high school students could exercise their
free speech rights by distributing pamphlets in a public mall, and that in doing
so, they had not violated the owner's property nor First Amendment rights.
447 U.S. at 88. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held that expenditure
limits in the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act, as amended in 1974, 18
U.S.C. § 608(c), (e) (limiting political expenditures by candidates for federal
office), violated the First Amendment. 424 U.S. at 58. The Supreme Court
reasoned that the restriction placed substantial restraints upon the quantity and
diversity of political speech. Id. at 58-59. For freedom of the press cases, see
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (asserting that there
is a constitutional right in the public to access in criminal proceedings);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (recognizing that First Amendment
extends to paid commercial advertisements); New York Times v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (denying federal government request to enjoin the
New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing a classified study
on the history of decision-making process during the Vietnam War); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring a showing of "actual
malice" before a public official may recover damages for a defamatory false-
hood).
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and feminists on the left.7 "Hate speech" has been outlawed by
dozens of local laws and ordinances, 8 and hundreds of college
campuses have imposed "speech codes" punishing expression that
demeans or denigrates people on the basis of race, gender, relig-
ion, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, etc. 9 College professors
have been sanctioned for racially and ethnically offensive
writings. 10 The protection of commercial speech has dimin-
ished, 11 and there have been legislative proposals abound to ban
the advertising of harmful, but otherwise lawful products such as
7. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnot, 771 F.2d 323 (7th
Cir. 1985).
8. See University of Wisconsin Rewrites 'Hate Speecl' Rule, CHICAGO
TRiUNE, Feb. 24, 1992 at 3 zone M; Marcia Coyle, Hate Laws Scrutinized by
Justices; Are Social Goals and the Constitution At Odds?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 2,
1991 at 1 (describing the St. Paul, Minnesota Ordinance § 292.02).
9. See, e.g., Doev. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (finding university's policy on discriminatory speech overbroad and
vague such that enforcement of the policy would violate Due Process Clause).
See also Daniel Harris, Whose Culture Is It Anyway?; Debating P.C.; The
Controversy Over Political Correctness on College Campuses, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Mar. 1, 1992 at 3 ("Many universities have adopted ordinances
requiring the expulsion or reprimand of students who use sexist, racist or
homophobic epithets . . . ."); GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW
1134-37 (12th ed. 1991) (noting how the debate "about appropriate regulations
engendered widespread attention and controversy" on campuses at the
University of Michigan, Stanford University and the University of Texas).
10. See, e.g., Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding that college had violated professor's First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights where it had warned students that the professor's views were controver-
sial and permitted a voluntary switch into another section; and where it had
begun an investigation of his writings, but not his conduct, in an alleged at-
tempt to revoke his tenure), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 966 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir. 1992).
11. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S.
328 (1986) (upholding ban on advertising of lawful activities); Board of Trus-
tees of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (rejecting absolute least restrictive
means test and requiring only a reasonable fit between the means and ends
when deciding whether government restrictions upon commercial speech are
constitutional); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of I11.,
496 U.S. 91 (1990) (states may require disclaimer where attorney advertises
certification or specialization if perceived to be potentially misleading).
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cigarettes. 12 Campaign speech has been subject to greater regula-
tion through measures and proposals that limit the funding of
such speech. 13 And, in a similar vein, significant restrictions on
the speech of those who receive federal and other public subsidies
for their activities have been proposed, imposed and upheld. 14
That is why this past Term's cases, as well as critical ones cur-
rently pending, are significant measures of the direction the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence will take in the face of
all of these assaults on the First Amendment freedoms.
First, some statistical measurements of the past Term: quanti-
tatively, the Court had a relatively small First Amendment
docket, deciding five significant free speech cases15 and handing
down two notable free press rulings. 16 A few years ago there
were twice as many First Amendment cases on the Court's plate
in a typical year. 17 This year, the First Amendment claimants
12. H.R. 4350, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. (1992); H.R. 2781, 102d Cong., 1st.
Sess. (1991); H.R. 2779, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1991); S. 1088, 102d
Cong., 1st. Sess. (1991); S. 556, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1991); H.R. 1443,
102d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1991); S. 557, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1991); H.R.
440, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1991).
13. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990). In Austin, the Supreme Court held a Michigan statute prohibiting cor-
porations from using corporate treasury funds for state political elections valid,
finding a legitimate state objective and that the statute was narrowly tailored to
achieve such objective. Id. at 660. The Court further rejected equal protection
arguments claiming nonprofit and for-profit corporations were treated differ-
ently under the law than labor unions, unincorporated associations and news
media corporations. Id. at 668.
14. See Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759 (1991), discussed infra notes
89-130 and accompanying text.
15. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991); Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991); Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S.
Ct. 1950 (1991); Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Leathers v. Med-
lock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
16. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991); Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
17. See Joel M. Gora, Supreme Court Report: Five Wins and Nine Losses
for Free Speech Fans, 71 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1985, at 116.
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basically "lost" four18 of the seven cases and partially lost the
others. 19 Only two First Amendment claimants left the Supreme
Court better off than when they got there. 20 There was a good
deal of disarray in those seven cases, three of which were decided
by various divided pluralities. 2 1 Most First Amendment claims
were deflected or rejected; and the hand of government, federal,
state and local, to tax, spend and regulate in the First Amend-
ment area seemed significantly more strengthened at the end of
the Term than it was at the beginning. As one commentator put
it:
18. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991); Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 1II S. Ct. 2456 (1991); Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759
(1991); Leathersv. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
19. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., I IIS. Ct. 2720 (1991); Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991); Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n,
111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991).
20. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991); Lenhert v. Fer-
ris Faculty Ass'n., 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991).
21. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991) (Justice Kennedy
announced the judgment of the Court in Parts III and VI and delivered an
opinion for Parts I, II, IV and V. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and
O'Connor joined with respect to Parts III and VI. Justices Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens joined with respect to Parts I, H1, IV and V. Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the judgment of the Court for Parts I and II. Justices White,
O'Connor, Scalia and Souter joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist also wrote a
dissenting opinion for Part II which was joined by Justices White, Scalia, and
Souter. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion.); Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment
of the Court and delivered an opinion joined by Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, as did
Justice Souter. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.); Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n,
111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991) (Justice Blackmun announced the Court's opinion for
Parts I, II, II-B, I-C, IV-B (except final paragraph), IV-D, IV-E and IV-F.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Marshall and Stevens joined.
Justice Blackmun also wrote an opinion for Parts I1-A, IV-A, final paragraph
of IV-B, V-C and V. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Stevens
joined. Opinions concurring and dissenting in part were written by Justices
Marshall, Scalia and Kennedy. Justices O'Connor and Souter joined in all but
Part HII-C of Justice Scalia's opinion, which Justice Kennedy joined.).
1992]
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The First Amendment's Free Speech Clause proved vulnerable
when matched against obligations and restrictions imposed by
other laws in several cases decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court .. .. It did not exempt family planning clinics from the
Reagan administration's ban on the expenditure of federal funds
for clinics that provide abortion counseling. It did not shield
nude dancers from the enforcement of a state indecency statute.
It did not protect newspapers from liability for breach of a
promise of confidentiality for a news source. Nor did it help an
attorney who was disciplined for taking his client's case before
the press ... . Finally, it afforded only limited protection in a
libel action to a journalist alleged to have fabricated
quotations.22
Last year was also the first full Term without Justice Brennan
the foremost First Amendment theorist and activist of modern
times. And it showed. Justice Brennan's presence would have
clearly changed the result in two of the most significant cases: the
abortion counseling "gag rule" case2 3 and the nude dancing
decision. 24 His departure also deprived the Court of its master
consensus builder, who could coalesce a majority better than
anyone. 25 This year the Court also lost its most consistent
spokesman of the dissenting voices, Justice Marshall. 26 The
hallmark of both Justices Brennan and Marshall in assessing First
Amendment claims was not just their concern with formal free
speech doctrine and analysis, but as well their sensitivity to the
practical effects of legislative restrictions on speech as they
impact real people and real speakers in the real world. It is cer-
tainly not clear whether and how Justices Souter and Thomas will
fill those respective shoes.
22. Review of Supreme Court's Term, 60 U.S.L.W. 3069 (U.S. Aug. 6,
1991).
23. See Rust v. Sullivan, I IlS. Ct. 1759 (1991).
24. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
25. See Mary C. Daly, Some Runs, Some Hits, Some Errors - Keeping
Score In the Affirmative Action Ballpark From Weber to Johnson, 30 B.C. L.
REv. 1, 51-52 (1988).
26. Justice Thurgood Marshall retired on June 27, 1990, the last day of the
1990 Supreme Court Term.
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In my remarks today, I will discuss the significant First
Amendment cases, try to identify some themes and trends, and
hazard some predictions about cases pending on the Court's
docket this coming Term.27 The Court's seven relevant cases fall
into three categories: three cases involved the intersection be-
tween free speech rights and the government's taxing and spend-
ing powers;28 two concerned the rights of the press;29 and the fi-
nal two involved key areas of local regulation: public decency
and morality30 and proper conduct by the legal profession. 31
TAXING, SPENDING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Constitutional law has long recognized a distinction between
government as regulator and government as taxer and spender.
Though Chief Justice Marshall once warned that "the power to
tax involves the power to destroy," 32 and though oppressive
taxation was one of the battle cries of the American Revolution
and one of the reasons for the framing of the First Amendment,
the Court has been more deferential to the fiscal power than to
regulatory power.33 In three cases involving speech activity that
the government clearly could not prohibit, punish or control, the
Court broadly upheld government authority to reach such speech
through the exercise of powers over taxing and spending. 34
27. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Simon &
Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
28. See Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991); Rust v.
Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438
(1991).
29. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991); Masson v.
New Yorker Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
30. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
31. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
32. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
33. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991); Lenhert v. Ferris
Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991); Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759
(1991).
34. Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991); Lenhert v. Ferris
Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991); Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759
(1991).
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Leathers v. Medlock
It has long been settled that the First Amendment does not give
the press an exemption from general regulations or tax laws. 35 It
is equally well-settled, however, that government cannot single
out the press, or particular members of the press, for special or
punitive taxation. 36 That latter principle, fashioned in a 1930s
case involving Louisiana Governor Huey Long's attempt to tax
his major newspaper critics, 37 was expanded in a 1983 Minnesota
case when the Court held that the press was protected not just
against corruptly motivated and suppressive taxes, but also
against any tax whose structure singled out the press for special
taxation. 38 In 1987, the Court likewise threw out an Arkansas
sales tax scheme that exempted religious, professional, trade and
35. See Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S.
378, 389 (1990) (Court found general sales and use tax was not a tax on right
to disseminate information, but a tax on retail sales or consumption of tangible
personal property); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,
229 (1987) (Arkansas sales tax scheme which exempted newspapers and
religious, professional, trade, and sports journals violated the First
Amendment because it was a selective tax); Minneapolis Star & Tribune v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 n.9 (1983) (Minnesota
"use tax" on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in the production of
a publication, exempting periodic publications, held in violation of the First
Amendment because it singled out the press for special treatment. However,
the tax clearly would have been constitutional if it were a generally applicable
tax.); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (Louisiana
license tax on newspaper owners for the privilege of selling advertising space
held unconstitutional; however, the Court warned, "it is not intended by
anything we have said to suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune
from any of the ordinary forms of taxation .... ).
36. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. 481 U.S. at 227 (state's enactment
of tax scheme which levied sales tax solely on general interest magazines de-
clared unconstitutional because it was based upon content of those magazines);
Gros/ean, 297 U.S. at 250 (Court declared unconstitutional an advertisement
tax on newspapers with a circulation greater than 20,000 copies per week be-
cause it was designed to limit the circulation of such newspapers).
37. See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 240.
38. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune, 460 U.S. at 592-93.
[Vol 9
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sports journals, but taxed political magazines. 39 The flaw there
was that the tax was based solely on the content of the periodi-
cal, 40 and a tax on the content was a tax on the message. 41
But what about a tax not on the message, but on the medium?
That was the issue in Leathers v. Medlock.42 The Arkansas legis-
lature, apparently still desperate for cash, specifically extended its
general sales tax to include cable and satellite broadcast services,
while most print media were exempted. 43 The eighty or so cable
operators in the state challenged the scheme on the ground that it
violated the First Amendment by singling out one particular me-
dium for disparate taxation treatment. 44
Justice O'Connor, writing for a seven Justice majority, 45
rejected the claim.46 She reasoned that this was not an attempt to
suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints. 47 Nor
was it targeted on a small, vulnerable or controversial group of
speakers. 48 There was no evidence that the tax was corruptly
motivated by a purpose to cripple the press and its vital watchdog
function as a check on government. 49 Finally, the tax was not
structured in a way which raised the suggestion or risk of
censorship.50
Central to her analysis were the assumptions that cable as a
medium did not have a distinctive voice, that all cable operators
were treated alike and that eighty of them were politically
potent.51 Given that no attempt, overt or covert, at censorship of
ideas was discerned, the Court then fell back to the general
39. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc., 481 U.S. at 234.
40. Id. at 233.
41. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1445 (1991); Rust v. Sul-
livan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1773 (1991).
42. 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
43. Id. at 1441.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1441 (Justices Marshall and Blackmun dissented).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1443-44.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1444.
50. Id. at 1445.
51. Id.
19921
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deference to the power of state and local government to classify
and differentiate among different groups and entities in the
taxation area.52 Accordingly, virtually no justification for the
disparate treatment of cable was required or suggested. 53
Critical to her analysis was the proposition that a taxing ar-
rangement that discriminates among speakers, taxing some while
exempting others, does not per se violate the First Amendment
unless it discriminates on the basis of the ideas being ex-
pressed. 54 This principle, derived from a 1983 case which upheld
adverse federal tax treatment of lobbying expenses in general,
while according favorable tax benefits to lobbying by veterans
organizations, 55 would play a pivotal role in upholding the fund-
ing restrictions in the abortion counseling case as well. 56
Missing from Justice O'Connor's analysis, however, as noted
by the two dissenters, Justices Marshall and Blackmun, was any
effort to explain why cable operators were being treated differ-
ently, 57 and more significantly, a failure to appreciate that cable
does, in general, convey a different kind of message than other
communications media. 58 Of positive significance, however, was
the fact that Justice O'Connor's opinion extolled the virtues and
values of a vigorous press as a check on government wrongdo-
ing59 and made clear, in studied dictum, that the Court would
remain particularly vigilant against schemes which singled out the
press for special taxation or other financial burdens imposed on
the basis of the content or viewpoint being expressed. 60
52. Id. at 1446 (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash.,
461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983)).
53. Id. at 1447.
54. Id. at 1445.
55. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540
(1983).
56. See Rust v. Sullivan, infra, notes 89-130 and accompanying text.
57. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1447 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1451 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1442 (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
246-51 (1936)).
60. Id. at 1443.
120 [Vol 9
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Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Association
Just as the First Amendment limits the power of government to
tax me on the basis of my ideas, 61 so too does it limit the power
of government to tax me to subsidize the ability of someone else
to express ideas which I oppose. 62
In 1977, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,63 the Court
ruled that while public sector unions could make non-members
within a collective bargaining unit pay for their fair share of col-
lective bargaining costs, 6 4 such objectors could not be made to
pay for the union's political and ideological advocacy. 65 This
rule was derived from the older, venerable principle, that the
First Amendment right to speak presupposes a right not to speak
and not to be forced to espouse ideas that you do not share.6 6
That is why school children cannot be compelled to pledge alle-
giance even to the nation's flag. 67
The Abood principle is easy to state, but devilishly difficult to
apply, and the Court has wrestled ever since with two problems:
(1) how to differentiate between impermissible ideological and
61. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540
(1983).
62. See Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n., 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991).
63. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). In Abood, a Michigan statute authorizing
"agency shops" was challenged by a group of teachers who opposed collective
bargaining in the private sector as well as some of the non-collective bargain-
ing activities of the union. Id. at 212-13.
64. Id. at 236.
65. Id. at 234-36.
66. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("[The
right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state
action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all."); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 363-64 n.17 (1976) (state
may not require membership in a political party as a condition of employ-
ment); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (state may not compel
an individual to affirm his belief in God).
67. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(school children whose attendance was mandatory could not be compelled to
pledge allegiance to national flag).
1992]
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political activities and proper collective bargaining costs,6 8 and
(2) what procedures must be used to enforce that distinction 69
and safeguard the right of dissenting employees not to pay for the
latter. 70 In Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 7 1 the Court dealt
once again with the question of how to enforce the differentiation
between political or ideological activities and collective bargain-
ing activities in an effort to protect the rights of dissenting em-
ployees. The case produced such a confusing lineup of concurring
opinions as to require a calculator to determine exactly which
Justices formed a majority on each of the various specific is-
sues. 72
In Lenhert, a local college professor objected that his "service
fee" paid to the union in lieu of union dues was being used to
support a variety of improper local, state and national activities
of the union, the National Education Association (NEA). 7 3 He
was particularly upset about two things: (1) subsidizing expenses
of the state and national unions for activities not directly related
to support of his local bargaining unit74 and (2) having to support
a wide variety of union activities not explicitly related to collec-
tive bargaining and statutory duties of representation. 75
68. See Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1956 (1991).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991).
72. Blackmun, J., announced the opinion of the Court and delivered the
opinion with respect to Parts I, II, III-B, III-C, IV-B (except for final para-
graph), IV-D, IV-E, IV-F in which Rehnquist, C.J., and White, Marshall, and
Stevens, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dis-
senting in part. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part, in which O'Connor and Souter, JJ., joined, and in all
but Part III-C of which Kennedy, J., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
73. Lenhert, 111 S. Ct. at 1955-56. The union charged them for (1)
lobbying and electoral politics; (2) bargaining, litigation and other activities on
behalf of persons not in Lenhert's unit; (3) public relations efforts; (4)
miscellaneous professional activities; (5) meetings and conventions of the
parent unions; and (6) preparation for a strike which, had it materialized,
would have violated Michigan law. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
[Vol 9
FIRST AMENDMENT
Justice Blackmun announced the Court's judgment and his pre-
vailing plurality opinion applied what Justice Scalia's opinion
mockingly called "a proverbial three-part test"76 to determine
which activities the objectors could properly be made to help
support. 77 The elements of the test were as follows: (1) whether
the activities were "germane" to collective bargaining; (2)
whether they were justified by the government interest in promot-
ing labor peace and preventing non-union "free riders;" and (3)
whether the challenged activities had not added significantly to
the abridgment of the free speech already inherent in allowing an
agency or union shop arrangement to begin with, a kind of First
Amendment harmless error test.78
The plurality's application of this test produced one relatively
clear and categorical rule: dissenters can be made to pay for oth-
erwise chargeable costs of state and national unions, 79 even for
activities not being used for the direct and immediate benefit of
the specific local bargaining unit.80 Beyond that, the plurality
opinions produced, in a very ad hoc fashion, a series of specific
do's and don'ts: objectors can be made to pay for union
programs, information on professional development, the costs of
sending local delegates to state and national conventions and
strike preparations. 81 However, objectors cannot be made to de-
fray the costs of lobbying, nor political or electoral work not re-
lated to contract ratification or implementation, general public
propaganda about the importance of teachers nor the costs of liti-
gation not connected to the local unit. 82
Obviously, these details are of considerable interest and impor-
tance to local government and municipal labor counsel. But what
is troubling about the case is that the Court's flexible and subjec-
tive approach to what is "germane," compels the Court to rum-
76. Id. at 1975 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1959.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1961.
80. Id. at 1959 (citing Lenhert v. Faculty Ass'n, 881 F.2d 1388, 1392
(6th Cir. 1989)).
81. Id. at 1964-66.
82. Id. at 1960-61.
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mage through union literature, newsletters, public education ma-
terials, and the like in an effort to separate the political and
ideological from the economic and legitimate. 83 And the Court
does so in a disturbingly ad hoc, subjective and conclusory man-
ner. 84 That is why Justice Scalia's approach, in a partial dissent
joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, 85 seems more
attractive. He would rule that dissenting employees can only be
made to pay for the cost of discharging "the union's statutory
duties as exclusive bargaining agent." 86 That more categorical
approach would keep the Court from having so closely to scruti-
nize and parse the minute content of union speech. 87
In any event, the bottom line is that most of the Court remains
considerably antagonistic to mandatory charges for union activi-
ties that can even remotely be characterized as political and sig-
nificantly protective of the rights of dissenting unit members not
to subsidize union political speech they do not support nor ap-
prove. 88
Rust v. Sullivan
The principle that dissenting unit employees cannot be made to
subsidize speech they disapprove seems to hold true for govern-
ment as well. 89 It, too, can refuse to subsidize speech of which it
disapproves, or at least speech that goes beyond the scope of the
83. Id. at 1959. In Lenhert, the Court examined various union literature
including a newsletter which "concern[ed] teaching and education generally,
professional development, unemployment, job opportunities, award programs
of the NEA, and other miscellaneous matters." Id. at 1964.
84. Id. at 1967 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1975.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1976 (Justice Scalia described his proposed test as "much more
administrable. ").
88. Id. at 1960-61.
89. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1775 (1991) ("The employees'
freedom of expression is limited during the time that they actually were em-
ployed for the [federally funded] project; but this limitation is a consequence
of their decision to accept employment [,]... the scope of which is permissi-
bly restricted by the funding authority.").
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project or activity that the government is funding. 90 That, of
course, is the broad teaching of the Court's most controversial
and criticized decision of the year in the abortion counseling "gag
rule" case. 9 1 In Rust v. Sullivan,92 the Court upheld, by a 5 to 4
margin, federal regulations prohibiting projects that receive fed-
eral family planning grants from using any of those funds to ad-
vise particular clients about the abortion option or more generally
to advocate or promote abortion. 93 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
the Court's opinion for himself and Justices White, Kennedy,
Scalia and Souter. 94 Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens and
O'Connor dissented. 95 The Court's ruling prompted a great deal
of public outrage and massive efforts to have Congress overturn
the regulations. But the efforts fell short of the votes required to
override a presidential veto. 96
In 1970, Congress passed Title X of the Public Health Service
Act 97 to provide federal funding for family planning services.
Congress proscribed, however, that none of the funds could be
90. Id. at 1772.
91. Id.
92. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
93. Id. at 1778.
94. Id. (majority opinion begins at 1764).
95. Id. (dissenting opinion begins at 1778).
96. After the Rust decision, both the House and Senate voted to negate the
ruling. The House voted 276-156 and the Senate 75-25. However, the Presi-
dent's veto was sustained by the one-third-plus-one minority in just one cham-
ber, the House. The abortion counseling/advocacy regulations are just some of
the most visible examples of a long-running campaign by conservatives start-
ing in the early days of the Reagan Administration to "defund the left." The
theme of this campaign was that numerous recipients of various kinds of fed-
eral grants were impermissibly using those funds to subsidize offensive or im-
permissible political and social advocacy and activities. Other examples of the
campaign include: promulgating rules to ban grantees from engaging in
"political advocacy" broadly defined, restrictions on the kind of litigation that
can be brought by legal services organizations, see Texas Rural Legal Aid,
Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and withholding
of art funding from artists whose work the government considers obscene. See
Bella Lewitsky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal.
1991).
97. Public Health Service Act, 84 Stat. 1506, amended by, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300 -300a-6 (1989).
19921
TOURO LAW REVIEW
used "in programs where abortion is a method of family plan-
ning." 98 In other words, a grantee can use the funds for family
planning services and activities, but not for performing abor-
tions. 99
In 1988, the Reagan Administration promulgated regulations
intended to enforce this limitation100 by restricting how Title X
grantees could use the federal project funds:
1. The project "may not provide counseling concerning the
use of abortion as a method of family planning or provide
referral for abortion as a method of family planning"; 101
2. The project may not engage in activities that "encourage,
promote or advocate abortion as a method of family plan-
ning" 102 and
3. Title X projects must be organized so that they are
"physically and financially separate" from the prohibited
abortion activities of the grantee. 103
In other words, family planning organizations receiving Title X
family planning money could not use those funds to counsel or
advise individual women concerning abortion or more generally
promote or advocate abortion. 104 Even though they remained free
to use their own funds and resources as they saw fit, they had to
insure a hermetical seal between the Title X projects and other
activities. 105
From a statutory interpretation perspective, the portion of the
opinion holding that these regulations, promulgated almost two
decades after the statute they were purportedly implementing,
were authorized by the Congressional ban on using federal funds
98. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1764-65; 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-6, 1008.
99. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1765. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), the right of the government to refuse
to subsidize abortions had been upheld against constitutional challenges based
on privacy and equal protection grounds.
100. 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1991).
101. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1991).
102. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1991).
103. 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1991).
104. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1765 (1991).
105. Id. at 1766.
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for abortion services themselves, has also been extremely contro-
versial. 106 The Court's tests for whether Executive Branch regu-
lations are consistent with Congressional purpose were extremely
deferential to administrative interpretation and gave the Executive
Branch broad power to frustrate congressional intent. 107 More-
over, it has long been a staple of constitutional analysis that le-
gitimate doubts about the meaning of a statute or the authority of
implementing regulations should be resolved in a manner that
avoids unnecessary constitutional adjudication. 108 Had the Court
not strained to find the challenged regulations authorized, it could
have avoided the difficult and troubling constitutional rulings that
ensued, at least until Congress forced the constitutional question
by legislating more explicitly. 10 9 Indeed, that was the basis of
Justice O'Connor's dissent, namely, that the statutory authority
for the regulations was sufficiently doubtful that they should have
been thrown out on that ground alone, thus sparing the bloody
constitutional First Amendment battle that resulted. 110
At the constitutional level, the case required the Court to
choose between two parallel lines of precedent. One doctrine
holds that government has no obligation to fund or subsidize
speech and that the refusal to do so is not a penalty on speech. 111
Moreover, government can choose to subsidize some kinds of
speakers, such as veterans' organizations, but not others. 112
106. See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice
and the First Amendment, 105 HARv. L. REv. 554, 573-74 (1991).
107. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)).
108. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157-58 (1984);
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972); Burton v. United States,
196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905); Liverpool, New York and Philadelphia S.S. Co. v.
Commissioner of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885).
109. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1788-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 1767 (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash.,
461 U.S. 540 (1983)).
112. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,
546-49 (1983) (sustaining tax deduction for contributors to veterans' organiza-
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Government can also say how its funds are to be spent within the
appropriate scope of the funding program. 113 The other line of
cases holds that government cannot use its fiscal powers to try to
suppress dangerous ideas, and that government may not withhold
an otherwise available benefit from a recipient who engages in
otherwise protected speech unrelated to that benefit. That would
be an "unconstitutional condition" on speech, and the financial
sanction would become transformed from the withholding of a
subsidy to the imposing of a penalty. 114
Despite basic geometry principles, these two parallel lines met
in Rust. The Court's resolution was clear: the Title X regulations
fell on the subsidy side of the line, not on the penalty side. 115
Most importantly, the Court emphasized, the regulations were
not a direct restriction on the grantees' use of their own funds
and resources to advocate anything they want with respect to
abortion, outside of the scope of the funded project:
The regulations govern the scope of the Title X project's activi-
ties, and leave the grantee unfettered in its other activities. The
Title X grantee can continue to perform abortions, provide
tions); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 97-98 (1976) (per curiam) (sustaining
funding of general election expenses of major party candidates).
113. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 545-46 (1983) (upholding I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(1954) which did not permit tax exempt status for lobbying activities); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding subsidies for presidential
campaign under Congress' power to decide which expenditures promote the
general welfare); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (holding
I.R.S. regulations prohibiting ordinary and necessary business deduction for
lobbying activities were a valid exercise of Commissioner's rule making
power).
114. See, e.g., F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364
(1984) (Court held public broadcasting stations could not be denied public
funds because they used their own funds to editorialize); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972) (reaffirming position that renewal of nontenured
public school teacher's contract may not be based on individual's exercise of a
constitutional right); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958) (finding
California statute requiring subscription to an oath as a condition to tax exempt
status was a discriminatory provision which placed a limitation on free
speech).
115. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1780 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting).
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abortion-related services, and engage in abortion advocacy; it
simply is required to conduct those activities through programs
that are separate and independent from the project that receives
Title X funds. 116
According to the majority, the government was simply trying to
make sure that project funds are kept within the scope of the
project's purpose: family planning, not abortion. 117 Since the
government is not constitutionally required to fund abortion, 118 it
is not required to fund abortion speech, counseling nor advo-
cacy. 119 The refusal to do so is not a discrimination on the basis
of viewpoint, but just a definition of the scope of the grant. 120
The dissenters, led by Justice Blackmun, the author of Roe v.
Wade, 121 bitterly complained that this was clearly a penalty case
designed to punish the expression of the pro-choice point of
view: "Until today, the Court never has upheld viewpoint-based
suppression of speech simply because that suppression was a
condition upon the acceptance of public funds." 122 In his view,
the regulations were content-based, since they turned on what
was said by personnel of the Title X project. 123 Worse, they
were viewpoint-based since they require the giving of prenatal
advice, while prohibiting the provision of abortion advice. 124
The repression is imposed as a condition of receiving public
funds, which will be withdrawn as a penalty for violating that
condition by counseling abortion. In short, the government
clearly cannot outlaw abortion counseling and advocacy, and
116. Id. at 1774.
117. Id. at 1772.
118. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511
(1989) ("[Tuhe State need not commit any resources to facilitating
abortions .... "); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) ("[~t simply
does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a
constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full
range of protected choices.").
119. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772-73.
120. Id.
121. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
122. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1780 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 1781 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1781-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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should not be permitted to achieve that prohibited result indirectly
through its power of the purse. 125
Rust v. Sullivan is, indeed, a difficult case. The decision has
been condemned in epic and frequently apocalyptic terms. 126 But
whether it deserves such unlimited condemnation is not all that
clear to me. It is, after all, a funding case, not a prohibition case.
It does not control, at least directly, what groups can do with
their own funds and resources. It does make it burdensome to
erect a wall of separation between restricted and unrestricted
funds, but non-profit groups have long known how to separate, at
least financially, their lobbying and political activities from their
charitable and educational functions, in order to take advantage
of the tax laws. Finally, there is a bit of sauce for the gander here
in that, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, Congress has long at-
tached civil rights stipulations and requirements to various federal
funding programs, and, of course, liberal groups have applauded
and defended those requirements. 12 7
Having said that, however, I remain very troubled by the rul-
ing. First, of course, the ruling operates most harshly on vulner-
able women who require the services of publicly funded family
planning clinics; 128 women able to afford private medical atten-
125. Id. at 1782 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
126. See, e.g., Gary A. Winters, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions As
"Nonsubsidies ": When Is Deference Inappropriate?, 80 GEo. L.J. 131, 134-35
(1991) ("[T]he Court's new approach to rights-affecting benefit allocations re-
flects a fundamental misconception of the role of the state in the modem con-
stitutional order."). See also Stephen F. Rohde, Rust v. Sullivan: Subverting
the Constitution and Abusing Judicial Power?, 25 BEVERLY HILLS B.A. J.
155, 169 (1991) ("[T]he majority in Rust subverted the Constitution and
abused its judicial powers . . . [by] distort[ing] settled constitutional
principles; ignor[ing] stare decisis; concealfing] conflicting precedents and
misstat[ing] the record.").
127. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1775-76 n.5 (citing Grove City College v. Bell, 65
U.S. 555 (1984)).
128. See Rohde, supra note 126 at 156 ("[A]pproximately ninety percent of
the women served [by Title X projects] have incomes below 150 percent of the
poverty line."). See also Peter Linzer, Is the First Amendment A Middle-Class
Luxury?, 29 DEC Hous. LAW 18 (1991) ("[I]t is [the] poor, young, and all-
too-often non-white women who use publicly funded clinics... [who] do not
hear about abortion alternatives. .... ").
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tion will receive unrestricted medical advice and information.
More generally, public funding of private groups to perform
public services is pervasive in our society, and the Court is
allowing otherwise impermissible restrictions on speech to be im-
posed in the interests of keeping the grantee within the "scope"
of the funded project. 129 1 also worry about the application of the
"gag rule" approach to other professionals who are publicly
funded, especially lawyers who are public defenders or legal aid
attorneys. It is one thing to stipulate what kinds of cases they can
handle; but it is quite another to prevent them from at least advis-
ing their clients about other legal rights and remedies available to
them. Finally, how will the Court apply these principles to
funded projects which themselves are First Amendment enter-
prises? I am speaking here, of course, of funding of the arts, the
National Endowment for the Arts and Senator Jesse Helms.
Notwithstanding the old adage, can we really tell our artists and
writers: if you want us to pay the piper, we get to call every note
of the tune. 130
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
The Court decided two Free Press cases, 131 both involving the
extent to which the First Amendment protects the press against
damage actions, in one case for tortious defamation, and in the
other for breach of contract.
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine
This was the case of the fabricated quotations. 132 Jeffrey Mas-
son, a psychoanalyst, was the subject of a New Yorker Magazine
129. See generally Rust, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
130. Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frolmmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 777
(C.D. Cal. 1991) (a recipient of a National Endowment for the Arts award was
required to sign a Terms and Conditions Agreement which provided
"submission of a request for funds constitutes agreement to comply with all
terms and conditions").
131. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991); Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
132. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
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piece 133 by Janet Malcolm, concerning Masson's dismissal as
projects director of the Sigmund Freud Archives, located at a
stately manor outside of London. 134 The article was based on
extensive interviews with Masson and revealed much of the be-
hind-the-scenes pettiness at the top of the psychoanalytic hierar-
chy. 135 The article, later turned into a book, 136 included nu-
merous statements by Masson, in quotation marks, which made
him appear to be insufferably pompous, or, as one reviewer put
it: "[A] grandiose egotist -- mean-spirited, self-serving, full of
braggadocio, impossibly arrogant . ... "137 Most provocative
were quotes that purported to have Masson describe himself as
"an intellectual gigolo," 138 but one whose expos6 of the Freud
Archives would mark him as, next to Freud, "the greatest analyst
who ever lived." 139
Masson sued Malcolm and The New Yorker for defamation,
claiming the quotes were fabricated and defamatory. 140 Of
course, since the landmark ruling of New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 14 1 in order to recover damages for defamation, public fig-
ures like Masson must show the defamatory statements or mean-
ings were made with knowledge that they were false or with
reckless disregard of the truth. 14 2 The doctrine was fashioned to
protect the press and public speakers from being punished
133. Janet Malcolm, Annals of Scholarship: Trouble in the Archives - 11,
THE NEw YORKER, December 12, 1983, at 60.
134. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2424.
135. Id.
136. Janet Malcolm, IN THE FREUD ARCHIVES (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1984).
137. Robert Coles, Freudianism Confronts Its Malcontents, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 27, 1984, at 58, 60.
138. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2425.
139. Id. at 2427.
140. Id. at 2425.
141. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times v. Sullivan, the New York
Times ran a full page advertisement implying that law enforcement officials
had improperly arrested and harassed Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and other
civil rights protesters on several occasions. The Court held that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments required a privilege of criticism of official conduct,
even where unintentionally false statements were made. Id.
142. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2429.
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through civil damages for honest mistakes and to encourage full
and vigorous reporting and discussion about government as well
as public affairs. 143
The issue in Masson was how to apply this protection to a
charge of fabricated and out-of-context quotations which, since
they purported to be the subject's own words, were particularly
damning. 144 Three possible approaches were available to the
Court. 145
Masson argued that, apart from correcting grammar or syntax,
publication of a quotation, with knowledge that it does not con-
tain the exact words of the subject, is enough to constitute falsity
in the New York Times sense. 146 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Court, thought this was too stringent a rule, given the realities of
interviews, reporting and interpretation:
[W]riters and reporters by necessity alter what people say, at the
very least to eliminate grammatical and syntactical infelicities. If
every alteration constituted the falsity required to prove actual
malice, the practice of journalism, which the First Amendment
standard is designed to protect, would require a radical change,
one inconsistent with our precedents and First Amendment prin-
ciples. 147
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on the other hand,
had concluded that so long as the altered quotations were at least
a "rational interpretation" of what the subject actually said, there
could be no liability. 148 Justice Kennedy rejected this position as
143. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) ("[An] honest ut-
terance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free
speech . . . ."); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152 (1967)
("[W]e have rejected ... the argument that a finding of falsity alone should
strip protections from the publisher.").
144. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2430-3 1.
145. The first approach was to make a distinction based upon correcting
grammar or syntax and some greater level of alteration. Id. at 2432. The sec-
ond was the common law approach to libel. Id. at 2432-33. The third was a
test of "substantial truth." Id. at 2433.
146. Id. at 2431.
147. Id.
148. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1539 (9th Cir.
1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
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too protective of the press and granting "near absolute constitu-
tional protection" by allowing excessive "interpretation" by jour-
nalists of what interview subjects actually say.149 Justice
Kennedy also suggested that newsworthy figures would become
wary of speaking to the press if their actual words could be so
flexibly reconfigured. 150
Avoiding both extremes, the Court steered a middle path,
holding that: "If an author alters a speaker's words but effects no
material change in meaning, including any meaning conveyed by
the manner or fact of expression, the speaker suffers no injury to
reputation that is compensable as a defamation." 151 Applying this
new "material change in meaning" rule, the Court concluded that
all but one of the disputed quoted passages differed materially in
meaning from Masson's actual statements; 152 accordingly, the
Court overturned the grant of summary judgment and remanded
the matter for trial. 153 Justices White and Scalia partially dis-
sented from giving any protection for misquotes and complained
that the Court was permitting reporters to "lie a little, but not too
much." 15 4
In effect, both sides emerged victorious from the New Yorker
case which represented an opinion respectful of and sensitive to
free press concerns. Masson got the right to prove his case and
the press got the right to deliberately alter quotes to some degree.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Company
The press fared less well in its other case before the Court. 155
Dan Cohen, a Republican political operative in Minnesota, leaked
damaging information to the press about a Democratic candidate
for Lieutenant Governor. 156 Reporters promised Cohen confi-
149. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2434.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2432.
152. Id. at 2435-37.
153. Id. at 2437.
154. Id. at 2438 (White, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 2513.
156. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516.
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dentiality in exchange for the information, as reporters are wont
to do.157 But the editors countermanded that pledge, deciding
that the identity of the leaker/source was especially newsworthy,
and the paper revealed his name as part of the story.1 5 8 Cohen
was fired from his political consulting job and sued the newspa-
per for breach of their pledge of confidentiality. 159 The Minne-
sota Supreme Court threw out a two hundred thousand dollar jury
verdict in Cohen's favor, concluding that First Amendment
interests outweighed Cohen's rights. 160
In a 5-4 ruling, the United States Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice White, reversed and remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings. 161 The case raised two important, but distinct,
issues of First Amendment doctrine. The press argued that it
could not be punished for publishing truthful, lawfully-acquired
information of public importance, absent a compelling
government interest. 162 But Justice White preferred "an equally
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. Cohen alleged fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract.
Id.
160. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990),
rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). The Minnesota Supreme Court found that Co-
hen had not established a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. Id. at 202. Upon
consideration of the breach of contract claim, the court found the claim to be
inappropriate. I& at 203. The court also entertained a claim of promissory es-
toppel which was not previously argued nor briefed by the parties. Id. The
court performed a balancing test between the common law right and the First
Amendment and concluded that the First Amendment interests outweighed the
interests in protecting persons who bad detrimentally relied on a promise. Id.
at 204-05.
161. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2516 (1991). Justices
White, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in the
majority, while Justices Marshall, Souter, Blackmun and O'Connor dissented.
Id.
162. Id. at 2518. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (publications about "confidential" reports concerning
public officials and their duties are held immune from criminal sanctions under
the First Amendment); see also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S.
97, 101 (1979) (statute bore a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality since it
acted in the form of a prior restraint, and the state's interest in protecting the
identity of a juvenile offender could not overcome this presumption); accord
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well-settled line of decision that generally applicable laws do not
offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement
against the press has an incidental effect on the ability to gather
and report the news." 163 If Minnesota contract law requires that
people, including reporters, must keep their promises, the First
Amendment does not require otherwise. 164 Accordingly, the
majority declined to engage in any careful balancing of the com-
peting interests in this particular case.
Justices Blackmun, Marshall, O'Connor and Souter dis-
sented. 165 Justice Blackmun's dissent saw the issue in terms of
the strict rules against imposition of liability based on the content
of speech, which would impose a direct, not an incidental, bur-
den on political communication. 166 An interesting dissent was
also written by Justice Souter, who spoke glowingly of the role of
the press in fostering the democratic dialogue. 167 He noted that
First Amendment rights cannot be analyzed by reference to the
interests of the press alone without considering the importance of
the information to public discourse: "[F]reedom of the press is
ultimately founded on the value of enhancing such discourse for
the sake of a citizenry better informed and thus more prudently
self-govered." 168 Indeed, his opinion was somewhat reminiscent
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 531 (1989) (press held entitled to pub-
lish truthful information from a police report).
163. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 689-90 (1972) (Court refused to extend "testimonial privilege" against
compelled self-incrimination to news reporters not enjoyed by other citizens
because "consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering" is insuffi-
cient to override fundamental function grand jury plays in law enforcement
process).
164. Id. at 2518-19.
165. Id. at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 2520-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun relied on
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), as supplying the controlling
principle that common law claims of tort or contract could not be routinely
used to penalize press reporting and editorial commentary by subjecting the
press to civil damages. Id. at 2521.
167. Id. at 2522-23 (Souter, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2523 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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of his predecessor, Justice Brennan, 16 9 which may augur well for
the press in future cases.
Observers have commented that in both these cases the press
may have lost the battle, but won the war. 17 0 Preventing the
press from fabricating quotes or "turning" confidential sources
may make people much more willing to be subjects and sources
in the future. The free flow of information to the public will
thereby be enhanced.
FREE SPEECH, PUBLIC DECENCY AND
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Well, I have saved the best for last: nude dancers171 and cri-
minal lawyers. 172 And I cannot decide which to do first.
What links these two cases is that they each involve interesting
issues not directly confronted before by the Court. In both cases,
there were sharp threshold disagreements about the essence of the
cases and what doctrinal handles to attach to them. Consequently,
each case produced a divided Court with no clear and consistent
majority. 17 3
169. See, Kathleen M. Sullivan's remarks, Constitutional Law Conference,
of United States Law Week (Sept. 6-7, 1991), synopsized and quoted in 60
U.S.L.W. 2253, 2266 (Oct. 22, 1991).
170. At the United States Law Week's Constitutional Law Conference,
Jesse H. Choper, Dean at the University of California at Berkeley, discussed
both Masson and Cohen and argued that they did not create a major limitation
on the freedom of the press. Id. at 2253. Similarly, Kathleen Sullivan, a
professor of criminal and constitutional law at Harvard Law School, stated that
the outcome of the "two press cases should not be regarded as true defeats for
freedom of the press." id. at 2266.
171. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
172. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
173. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458 (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia and Souter joined in the majority, while Justices
White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens dissented); Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at
2723 (Justices Kennedy, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor joined in
the majority, while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, Souter,
and O'Connor concurred and dissented in part).
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Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.
Like most states, Indiana has a public decency statute which
bans nudity in public places. 174 A bar and an adult entertainment
center, wanting to have live, totally nude dancers performing,
challenged the enforcement of the statute. 175 A lower federal
court, finding that nude dancing was non-obscene and embodied
significant expressive content, ruled that the First Amendment
shifts the burden of justification to the state, which, in this case,
failed to sustain that burden. 176 Accordingly, the issue before the
Court was whether the application of the public nudity statute
violated the First Amendment. 177 Five Justices held it did not,
but they could not agree on a rationale. 178 The case produced
four opinions with sharply differing perspectives. 179
174. IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988). The statute provides:
Public Indecency
l(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) appears in a state of nudity; or
(4) fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits a
public indecency, a class A misdemeanor.
(b)"Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals,
pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the
showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of
any part of the nipple, or the showing of the covered male genitals in a
discernibly turgid state.
175. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458-59.
176. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826, 830 (7th Cir.
1989).
177. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458.
178. Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court and de-
livered an opinion joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Justices Scalia
and Souter filed separate opinions concurring in the judgment. Id. at 2458.
179. Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that the nude dancing was a form of
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, albeit marginally. Id. at
2460. However, he upheld Indiana's public indecency statute, despite its
incidental limitations on some expressive activity, because the statute was
clearly within the constitutional power of the state and furthered substantial
governmental interests. Id. at 2461. The Chief Justice found that the statute
reflected moral disapproval of people appearing nude in public places. Id.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the Court's judgment, but
only spoke for three members of the Court. 180 He assumed that
live nude dancing was "expressive conduct within the outer pe-
rimeters of the First Amendment, though . .. only marginally
so." 181 Finding that the law involved a general prohibition on
conduct, public nudity, and was not directed at nude dancing and
its expressive features, 182 he applied the lower scrutiny test
formulated in the draft-card burning case, United States v.
O'Brien.1 83 That formula inquires whether the challenged law is
within the power of the government, furthers an important gov-
ernmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression,
and imposes an incidental restriction on speech no greater than
needed to achieve that interest. 184
Accordingly, the state had a "substantial governmental interest in protecting
order and morality" which was "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression." Id. at 2462.
Justice Scalia upheld the regulation "not because it survives some lower
level of First-Amendment scrutiny, but because, as a general law regulating
conduct and not specifically directed at expression, it is not subject to First-
Amendment scrutiny at all." Id. at 2463. Justice Souter agreed with the plural-
ity that nude dancing was a form of expressive conduct warranting some form
of First Amendment protection, but found that Indiana had a substantial inter-
est in combating the secondary effects that appear to accompany such activity,
most notably prostitution and sexual assaults. Id. at 2468-69.
Lastly, Justice White's dissent agreed that nude dancing was protected con-
duct under the First Amendment. Id. at 2474. However, Justice White rejected
the notion that the statute was a generally proscriptive law. Id. at 2473 ("No
arrests have ever been made for nudity as part of a play or ballet."). Instead he
found the purpose of applying the statute was to "prevent.. .customers from
being exposed to the distinctive communicative aspects of nude dancing." Id.
at 2476. Consequently, Justice White would strike down the statute because it
targeted the expressive nature of the conduct. Id.
180. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy. Id. at 2458.
181. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
182. Id.
183. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
184. Id. at 377.
19921 139
TOURO LAW REVIEW
Although the specific governmental purpose of the Indiana
statute was unknown, 185 the Chief Justice took judicial notice
that, as far back as Adam and Eve, there has been "moral dis-
approval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in
public places." 186 (I guess he must have missed the original
Olympic Games in ancient Greece.) Accordingly, the statute was
found to further a substantial governmental interest in protecting
order and morality. 187 Moreover, the ban was no more an effort
to suppress expression than was the general prohibition on nudity
in the streets. 188 Finally, the law, effectively requiring the
wearing of pasties and a G-string, did not deprive nude dancing
of whatever erotic message it may present, but simply made that
message slightly less graphic, a concern easily overcome by the
interest in societal disapproval of public nudity. 189
To my mind, the real danger of the plurality opinion is not the
result, I think the Bill of Rights will survive at least another two
hundred years without live nude dancing, but the reasoning.
Having treated this as a First Amendment case, the Chief Justice
then let speech interests be easily and casually overridden by the
most vague and amorphous community interest in "moral
disapproval" of public nudity. 190 Many key free speech cases
would have come out the other way under such a lax standard. 191
That is why Justice Scalia's concurring opinion does far less
damage to First Amendment interests. To Justice Scalia, this was
185. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461 ("It is impossible to discern, other than
from the text of the statute, exactly what governmental interest the Indiana
legislators had in mind when they enacted this statute, for Indiana does not re-
cord legislative history, and the state's highest court has not shed additional
light on the statute's purpose.").
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2462.
188. Id. at 2463.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2463-68.
191. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (Court
struck down ordinance which prohibited drive-in movie theatres with screens
visible from street from showing films containing nudity); Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (state cannot punish an individual for wearing a jacket
with explicative words written on it in the courthouse).
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not even a First Amendment case at all. Rather it was one involv-
ing a general law regulating conduct: "In my viewv... the chal-
lenged regulation must be upheld, not because it survives some
lower level of First Amendment scrutiny, but because, as a gen-
eral law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at ex-
pression, it is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all." 192
Thus, so long as the government is not targeting expression or
communication, it is free to legislate on the basis of community
morality. 193 If, however, the government is targeting expression
by words or deeds, all the First Amendment heavy artillery must
be wheeled out. 194 According to Justice Scalia, that is why he
voted to overturn convictions for burning the American flag
where the whole purpose of such laws was to suppress symbolic
dissent. 195
Much more worrisome, unfortunately, was Justice Souter's
dispositive concurrence. 196 His opinion took the reverse of Jus-
tice Scalia's position. First, he found that live nude dancing did
have substantial expressive force, and therefore, was entitled to
significant First Amendment protection. 197 But then, he voted to
sustain the law, nonetheless, not because these free speech inter-
ests were overcome by society's moral sensibilities, but because
of the government's substantial interests in combating "secondary
effects," such as prostitution, assault and the like of adult
192. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463 (Scalia, J., concurring). Here, Justice
Scalia played the theme he fashioned in a free exercise of religion case,
Employment Division, Oregon Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S.
Ct. 1595 (1990), to the effect that general laws not specifically targeted at
religious (or, as here, expressive) practices do not require heightened scrutiny.
Id. at 1603.
193. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461-62 (Scalia, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 2465-66 (Scalia, J., concurring).
195. I. at 2466 (Scalia, J., concurring). See, e.g., United States v.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (court held that prosecution for flag burning
in violation of flag burning act of 1989 was inconsistent with First
Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (conviction for flag
desecration held in violation of the First Amendment).
196. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2468-71 (Souter, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring).
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entertainment establishments like these. 198 But there was no evi-
dence in the record to sustain such a finding. 199 And ironically,
the "secondary effects" doctrine is one that Justice Souter's
predecessor, Justice Brennan, had consistently condemned. 200
It was left to Justice White, for the four dissenters, to take the
more traditional line of First Amendment analysis. 201 Nude
dancing has a powerful expressive message and content. 20 2 Jus-
tice White noted that the nudity prohibition is not of general ap-
plication; it does not apply, for example, at home, or in connec-
tion with ballet or legitimate theater productions. 203 Therefore, it
is clear that Indiana's purpose was to suppress this particular
message and the ideas the state thought the message contained. 20 4
Once it is assumed that the law was thus targeted on the message
and its impact, rigorous First Amendment scrutiny and
justification were required. 205 As Justice White put it:
It is only because nude dancing performances may generate
emotions and feelings of eroticism that the State seeks to regulate
such expressive activity, apparently on the assumption that creat-
ing or emphasizing such thoughts and ideas in the minds of the
spectators may lead to increased prostitution and the degradation
of women. But generating thoughts, ideas, and emotions is the
essence of communication. The nudity element of nude dancing
198. Id. at 2468-69 (Souter, J., concurring).
199. See Marianne Wesson, Sex, Lies and Videotape: The Pornographer As
Censor, 66 WASH. L. REv. 913, 929 n.79 (1991).
200. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) ("I write separately ... to register my continued disagreement with the
proposition that an otherwise content based restriction on speech can be recast
as 'content neutral' if the restriction 'aims' at 'secondary effects' of speech.");
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 56 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan argued that the Court's focus on secondary ef-
fects was "misguided" since it did not support the conclusion that content-
based regulations are thus rendered content-neutral because they purport to
address such secondary effects).
201. Justice White wrote the dissent which was joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens.
202. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2471 (White, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 2472-73 (White, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 2473-74 (White, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 2474 (White, J., dissenting).
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performances cannot be neatly pigeonholed as mere 'conduct'
independent of any expressive component of the dance. That fact
dictates the level of First Amendment protection to be accorded
the performances at issue here.206
The law failed that strict test because, even if compelling interests
are conceded, the state had many more narrow alternatives by
which to secure those interests. 207
I think the dissenters have the better of it. There was no real
assessment of the harm from live nude dancing in a controlled
context.208 The very casual way that the plurality let the "moral
disapproval" of the community trump expressive activity is a
troubling invitation to local government to return to the days of
broad regulation of speech found immoral, offensive or obnox-
ious to community standards, which would overturn long settled
First Amendment understandings. 209
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada
This case was the Term's other "gag rule" case, involving not
health care providers, but criminal defense lawyers. The case
provided the first occasion for the Court to confront broadly the
question of controlling the extrajudicial comments of lawyers in
an asserted effort to protect the integrity of the adjudicatory proc-
ess.210 The Court has decided numerous cases involving attempts
206. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 2475 (White, J., dissenting).
208. I also found it surprising that the Court made no mention of two cases
which had struck down bans on the display of nudity in controlled settings.
Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (Jacksonville ordinance mak-
ing exhibition of movies with nudity a punishable public nuisance held in vio-
lation of the First Amendment); Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546 (1975) (Court held that denial by City of Chattanooga of use of
municipal theater, a public forum, for showing of musical "Hair" constituted
an unlawful prior restraint).
209. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (conviction for flag
desecration held inconsistent with First Amendment); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971) (conviction for wearing jacket bearing profane words held in-
consistent with the First Amendment).
210. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
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to secure a fair trial by imposing gag orders on the press, 211 as
well as several cases involving restraints on attorney speech that
consisted of advertising or soliciting legal services. 2 12 But this
was the Court's initial major encounter with "gag rule" restric-
tions on attorney speech in the fair trial context. 2 13 And the re-
sult in the case reflects the difficulties of the issue.
The facts that gave rise to the issue came straight out of The
French Connection.214 In Gentile, police discovered large
amounts of cocaine and travelers' checks missing from the pri-
vately-owned vault they utilized for the purpose of conducting
undercover operations. 215 The contraband had been kept in a
vault at the privately-owned Las Vegas Vault Company and
simply disappeared. 216 There were months of press speculation
and leaks about whether any members of the narcotics detective
squad had been involved. 2 17 Ultimately, however, the focus of
suspicion in the press reports shifted to the Vault Company
owner, who was represented by Dominic Gentile, a prominent
member of the criminal defense bar. 218 When Gentile got a tip
211. E.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (civil sanctions
imposed upon newspaper for publishing a rape victim's identity violated the
First Amendment); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Ct. for Okla. County,
430 U.S. 308 (1977) (pretrial order enjoining press from naming juvenile or
publishing his picture abridged freedom of press); Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (presumption against prior restraint has particular
force in reporting of criminal proceedings).
212. See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Reg. and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S.
91 (1990) (attorney's First Amendment rights, with respect to professional ad-
vertising, was subject to commercial speech standards); Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (direct mailing to clients with particular legal
problems protected); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)
(attorney could constitutionally advertise that ACLU would represent client
without a fee); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (attorney's
advertisement offering services at "very reasonable" prices not misleading and
was protected by First Amendment).
213. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
214. Id. at 2729 n.1. News reports of the conference reported that Gentile
compared his case with the French Connection case. Id.
215. Id. at 2727.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2728.
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that his client was about to be indicted for stealing the drugs and
money, he called a press conference which was held a few hours
after the indictment was returned. 219 At the conference, Gentile
read a prepared statement in which he said his client was being
framed and set up as a fall guy and that the real culprits were
some of the specific detectives in the narcotics unit. 220 In re-
sponse to reporters' questions, he refused to provide more de-
tailed information or speculation. 221
Six months later, Gentile's client was acquitted by a jury
which, concededly, had not been influenced at all by the attor-
ney's earlier press conference and statements. 222 Nonetheless,
state bar authorities commenced disciplinary proceedings charg-
ing Gentile with having made statements that reasonably might
have posed "a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding,"223 even though, in fact, they had
not.224 That provision in the Nevada Professional Conduct Code
was based on the American Bar Association Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.6,225 and thirty-one states, 226 including
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2724, 2729.
221. Id. at 2731-32.
222. Id. at 2730-31.
223. Id. at 2723 (emphasis added).
224. Id. at 2730 ("[N]ot a single juror indicated any recollection of
[Gentile] or his press conference.").
225. Id. at 2741 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part). Nevada Supreme
Court Rule 177 provides:
Trial Publicity
1. A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communi-
cation if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceed-
ing.
2. A statement referred to in subsection 1 ordinarily is likely to have
such an effect when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal
matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration, and
the statement relates to:
(a) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a
party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity
of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;
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(b) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarcera-
tion, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the exis-
tence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given
by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make
a statement;
(c) the performance or results of any examination or test or the re-
fusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or
the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;
(d) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or sus-
pect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarcera-
tion;
(e) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is
likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if dis-
closed create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or
(f) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless
there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is
merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent
until and unless proven guilty.
3. Notwithstanding subsection 1 and 2(a-f), a lawyer involved in the
investigation or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration:
(a) the general nature of the claim or defense;
(b) the information contained in a public record;
(c) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including the
general scope of the investigation, the offense or claim or defense
involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the
persons involved;
(d) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(e) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information
necessary thereto;
(f) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person in-
volved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likeli-
hood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest;
and
(g) in a criminal case:
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the
accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information neces-
sary to aid in apprehension of that person;
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agen-
cies and length of the investigation.
Id. at 2737 (app. B).
226. Id. at 2741 n. 1. States that have adopted Model Rule 3.6 verbatim in-
clude Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
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New York,227 have a similar provision.228 The Nevada
Disciplinary Board and the Nevada Supreme Court found that
Gentile had violated the rule and imposed a private reprimand.2 9
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, West Virginia and Wyoming. Id. States adopting it with minor
modification include Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Montana, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas and Wiscon-
sin. Id. Utah's statute employs a test of "substantial likelihood of materially
influencing." Id. Other states have adopted parts of the Model Rule such as
Michigan, Washington and Minnesota. Id. A number have adopted American
Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 7-107
(1991), including Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, Ohio, Tennessee, and Vermont. Id. at n.2. North Carolina employs
a "reasonable likelihood of prejudice" test. Id.
227. Id. at n.1. New York has adopted it with minor modification. The
New York Rule DR 7-107 provides:
Trial Publicity
A. A lawyer participating in or associated with a criminal or civil
matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a sub-
stantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.
B. A statement ordinarily is likely to prejudice materially an adjudica-
tive proceeding when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a
criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in
incarceration, and the statement relates to:
1. The character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a
party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity
of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness.
2. In a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarcera-
tion, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the exis-
tence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given
by the defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to
make a statement.
3. The performance or results of any examination or test of the re-
fusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or
the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented.
4. Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or sus-
pect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarcera-
tion.
5. Information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is
likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if dis-
closed create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial jury.
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The Supreme Court reversed. 230 The major issue was whether
to apply a "clear and present" or "imminent" danger test to the
lawyer's comments about the pending proceedings. 2 3 1 That, of
course, is the rigorous standard utilized when members of the
press or citizens are sought to be sanctioned for reports or state-
ments that impact a judicial proceeding, 232 and Gentile argued
6. The fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless
there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is
merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent
until and unless proven guilty.
C. Provided that the statement complies with DR 7-107(A), a lawyer
involved with the investigation or litigation of a matter may state the
following without elaboration:
1. The general nature of the claim or defense.
2. The information contained in a public record.
3. That the investigation of the matter is in progress.
4. The scheduling or result of any step in litigation.
5. A request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information
necessary thereto.
6. A warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person in-
volved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likeli-
hood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.
7. In a criminal case:
a. The identity, age, residence, occupation and family status of
the accused.
b. If the accused has not been apprehended, information neces-
sary to aid in apprehension of that person.
c. The fact, time and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, use of
weapons, and a description of physical evidence seized, other
than as contained only in a confession, admission or state-
ment.
d. The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agen-
cies and the length of the investigation.
N.Y. JUD. LAW APPENDIX CODE OF PROF. REsP. DR 7-107 (McKinney
1992).
228. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2741.
229. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 787 P.2d 386, 387 (Nev. 1990).
230. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2736.
231. Id. at 2732-33.
232. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (judicial or-
der prohibiting news reporting or commentary on public judicial proceedings
invalid); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (invalidated contempt citation
issued for publication of editorial critical of judge's ruling on pending motion
FIRST AMENDMENT
that lawyers are entitled to the same high level of First Amend-
ment protection. 233 Five Justices disagreed, ruling that for attor-
neys the lesser "substantial likelihood" standard contained in the
disciplinary rule is constitutionally sufficient.234 Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted the greater power courts have over behavior in
the courtroom and with respect to participants in judicial proceed-
ings, especially lawyers. 2 35 He also observed that lawyers have
been characterized as "officers of the court," with greater obli-
gations to the fairness of the adjudicatory process. 236 Accord-
ingly, as the rule only controlled lawyers' speech directly impact-
ing on the judicial process, it was narrowly confined and satisfied
the First Amendment. 237
Justice Kennedy wrote for four Justices23 8 who took a sharply
different view. In his estimation, the lawyer's comments were
classic political speech at the very "core of the First Amend-
ment:" 239 they were critical comments about government offi-
cials charged with misconduct and wrongdoing.2 40
Unlike other First Amendment cases this Term in which
speech is not the direct target of the regulation or statute in
question... this case involves punishment of pure speech in the
political forum. Petitioner engaged not in solicitation of clients
or advertising for his practice .... [Instead,] [h]is words were
directed at public officials and their conduct in office ....
There is no question that speech critical of the exercise of the
for new trial); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (contempt citation
for publication of editorials and cartoon critical of judge during pending trial
unwarranted); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (contempt citation
unwarranted for publication of editorial on pending litigation).
233. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2732-33.
234. Id. at 2738, 2748 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Scalia, Souter
and O'Connor, JJ. concurring).
235. Id. at 2743.
236. Id. (quoting In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 666, 668 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
237. Id. at 2745.
238. Id. at 2723 (Kennedy, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens,
JJ.).
239. Id. at 2724 (quoting Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376, 1381
(1990)).
240. Id. at 2724.
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State's power lies at the very center of the First Amendment.
Nevada seeks to punish the dissemination of information relating
to alleged governmental misconduct .... The judicial system,
and in particular our criminal justice courts, play a vital part in a
democratic state, and the public has a legitimate interest in their
operations. 24 1
For that reason Justice Kennedy viewed the "substantial likeli-
hood" formulation as inadequate protection for such vital public
speech by lawyers or anyone else. 242 Moreover, under even a
more watered-down test, there was no evidence whatsoever that
Gentile's remarks had a deleterious impact on the proceedings. 243
As she has in critical cases in the past, Justice O'Connor occu-
pied the pivotal position which determined the outcome of the
case. Having supplied the fifth vote to sustain the basic thrust of
the disciplinary rule as written, in other words, the "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" formulation, she then supplied
the fifth vote to overturn Gentile's reprimand. 24 4 The reason was
the vagueness of a "safe harbor" provision in the Nevada rule
which permitted an attorney to "state without elaboration . . .
[t]he general nature of the claim or defense." 245 Justice
O'Connor agreed that Gentile had tried to stay within the
boundaries of this exemption, and therefore it was sufficiently
uncertain in meaning as to invite the risk of content-based
discriminatory enforcement. 246
I think Justice Kennedy's approach is the better one. The cri-
minal justice system has become one of the most vital and con-
troversial areas of our public life. Think of the numerous and
notorious criminal proceedings that appear on the front pages,
241. Id. at 2724 (citations omitted).
242. Id. at 2725-27.
243. Id. at 2731.
244. Id. at 2748-49. Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined in the
opinion written by Justice Kennedy. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting
opinion which was joined by Justices White, Scalia and Souter. Justice
O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part with Justice Kennedy and in part
with Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 2723.
245. Id. at 2749 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing Subsection (3) of
Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177).
246. Id. at 2749.
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and more potentially on the television screens of America, every
day. The deck already often appears heavily stacked against
prominent defendants, whose indictments have usually been pre-
ceded by days and weeks of leaks about guilt. In this milieu, the
right of the defendant, through counsel, to counter this publicity
is vital to safeguard not only First, but Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment protections as well. 247
247. See Levine v. United States Dist. Ct., 775 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986). The court wrote:
Suppose, for example, the accused wishes to charge that the indictment
was politically or religiously motivated. The freedom to make such a
charge against the state is surely paramount among the freedoms pro-
tected by the First Amendment. To deprive the accused of his most
valuable resource in criticizing the government, his lawyer, is to re-
strict, and restrict severely, his First Amendment rights.
Id. at 1055. Cf. United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987)
(overturning gag order on defendant congressman in mail and bank fraud
case).
The issue of sanctioning attorneys for criticizing the criminal justice system
or the courts will not soon go away. Four days after the Court's decision in the
Gentile case, the New York Court of Appeals upheld a letter of reprimand is-
sued to former Brooklyn District Attorney Elizabeth Holtzman for having
"made a false allegation of specific wrongdoing" about a criminal court
judge's conduct in presiding over a sexual assault case. In re Holtzman, 78
N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 648
(1991). Just as the Supreme Court rejected the more protective Nebraska Press
rule, Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), against gag orders
in Gentile, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the more protective imes
v. Sullivan press rule, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), for
false charges against public officials in Holtzman. The Court feared that such a
rule would "immunize all accusations, however reckless or irresponsible, from
censure as long as the attorney uttering them did not actually entertain serious
doubts as to their truth." Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 192, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573
N.Y.S.2d at 43.
A Missouri court likewise upheld a reprimand against a prosecutor who
called an appellate court judge's ruling in a case "illogical" and "a little bit
less than honest," and who made other disparaging remarks about the bench.
In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 831 cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991). The
Court's refusal to hear these cases will likely encourage bar disciplinary
authorities to be even more aggressive in prosecuting lawyers who make dis-
paraging comments about the judiciary.
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CONCLUSION
In the few moments remaining let me try to make some overall
observations and hazard a few predictions. First, there was not
one case last Term where a clear majority stood for a powerful
and uncompromising view of First Amendment rights. 24 8
Second, there was a pattern of broader deference to governmental
choices regarding taxing, 249 spending, 250 preservation of moral
sensibilities25 1 and regulation of the legal profession. 252 Third,
as a result, more and more First Amendment rights will have to
be sought, in effect, in the legislature and with executive
agencies. That is where the gag rules on doctors and lawyers will
have to be overturned. The problem is this is a bad habit to get
into, namely, looking to legislative majorities and politically-
accountable executive officials to protect individual rights and to
be the final guardians of individual liberties.
Having sounded that somewhat gloomy note, I still have some
optimism about the immediate future in the Court. Two bench-
mark cases are currently pending, sub judice, at this writing. 253
Each will be significant bellwethers as to the Court's future First
Amendment path.
One case involves the well-known New York "Son of Sam"
law, 254 enacted to prevent criminals from profiting from the fruit
of their crimes by selling their stories to the media. The law al-
lows a state agency to impound such funds for a period of five
years so that victims of the wrongdoing can seek compensa-
tion.2 55 Pending before the Court is a challenge to the law
248. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 61-88 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 79-126 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 168-203 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 171-209 and accompanying text.
253. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.
Ct. 501 (1991); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). These
cases have since been decided. See infra note 261.
254. N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 632a (McKinney 1982).
255. The "Son of Sam Law" provides in pertinent part:
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brought by a publisher who contracted for the book that became
Wiseguj25 6 (and later the movie, GoodFellas).25 7 I think the
Court may throw out the Son of Sam Statute. If you look at Jus-
tice Kennedy's opinion in Gentile urging the vital need to speak
about issues of law and order,258 Justice O'Connor's concern in
the cable tax case about financial penalties against media based
on the content of their publications, 259 and Justice Souter's dis-
sent in the confidential source case showing sensitivity to the
journalist's craft,260 you may find the core of a majority to
overturn the law. 26 1
1. Every... corporation... contracting with any person... accused
or convicted of a crime in this state, with respect to the reenactment of
such crime, by way of movie [or] book.... shall submit a copy of such
contract to the board and pay over to the board any moneys which
would otherwise, by terms of such contract, be owing to the person so
accused or convicted .... The board shall deposit such moneys in an
escrow account for the benefit of and payable to any victim . . . of
crimes committed by: (i) such convicted person; or (ii) by such accused
person, but only if such accused person is eventually convicted of the
crime and provided that such victim, within five years of the date of the
establishment of such escrow account, brings a civil action in a court of
competent jurisdiction and recovers a money judgment for damages
against such person ....
4. Upon a showing by any convicted person that five years have elapsed
from the establishment of such escrow account and further that no ac-
tions are pending against such convicted person pursuant to this section,
the board shall immediately pay over any moneys in the escrow account
to such person ....
Id.
256. NICHOLAS PILEGGI, WISEGUY: LIFE IN A MAFIA FAMILY (Simon &
Schuster 1986).
257. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct.
501 (1991).
258. See supra notes 238-242 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
261. Happily, this prediction turned out to be accurate. On December 10,
1991 the Supreme Court unanimously invalidated New York's Son of Sam law
on First Amendment grounds. See Sitnon and Schuster, Inc., 112 S. Ct. at
501. Justice O'Connor did indeed write the majority opinion, finding the lawv
impermissibly imposed a financial disincentive on the speech at issue, singling
it out from among all speech engaged in by individuals who have committed
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The other major pending case 2 62 involves a local "hate speech"
ordinance, 2 63 applied to penalize a late night cross-burning on the
lawn of the home of a Black family that recently arrived in the
neighborhood. 264 From a free speech perspective, the facts are
not great; but neither is the ordinance, which sweepingly
condemns hurtful, bigoted speech by making it a crime to display
any symbol or writing "which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." 265 Though
the Minneapolis ordinance was narrowed by the state court, 266 its
reach remains troubling, as the oral argument before the Court
indicated. 267 And the case has powerful implications for all the
anti-bias "speech codes" enacted on so many of our campuses. 26 8
crimes. Id. at 508. Justice O'Connor relied on the press tax cases to find, in
effect, a tax on particular speech. Id. Justice Kennedy wrote a very strong
concurring opinion concluding that the law was inherently defective as a
purely content-based penalty on speech. Id. at 515 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
262. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
263. See ST. PAUL, MINN., LEG. CODE § 292.02 (1990) (Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance).
264. R.A.V., Ill S. Ct. at 2541.
265. ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS CODE §292.02 (1990). The St. Paul Bias
Motivated Crime Ordinance provides:
Whoever places on a public or private property a symbol, object, appel-
lation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly con-
duct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
266. See In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 510-11. See also Brief
for Petitioner at 6, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (Minnesota
Supreme Court tried to narrow ordinance by limiting application to "fighting
words" or "imminent lawless action").
267. Brief for Petitioner at 5, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)
("Section 292.02 is neither supported by a compelling interest nor narrowly
tailored to meet such an interest. The City of St. Paul has no legitimate objec-
tive in regulating politically unpopular or upsetting expressive conduct. To the
extent such expression merely causes discomfort or is unsettling to its audi-
ence, it is fully protected by the First Amendment.").
268. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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Since perfectly valid laws, like trespass and assault, are available
to deal with most bias crime, I hopefully predict that the Court
will feel that punishing speech is not the way to combat bigotry
and prejudice. 269
These are both victims' rights cases, victims of crime and vic-
tims of hate, and government understandably seeks to protect
such victims in order to preserve public morality and decency.
269. This prediction also proved accurate. On June 22, 1992, the Supreme
Court, with all Justices concurring in the judgment, invalidated the ordinance
on First Amendment grounds. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(1992). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy,
Souter and Thomas, delivered the opinion of the Court and held that the ordi-
nance was facially invalid under the First Amendment because "it prohibits
otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech ad-
dresses." Id. at 2542.
The Court accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction that the
ordinance was narrowly tailored, and reached only expressions constituting
"fighting words." Id. at 2541-42. The Court also acknowledged that fighting
words, like other limited categories of speech, such as obscenity or defama-
tion, may be "regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable con-
tent." Id. at 2543. However, the Court noted that these categories of speech
are not "entirely invisible to the Constitution," id., thus the "government may
not regulate [their] use based on hostility or favoritism towards the underlying
message expressed." Id. at 2545. The Court found that not all "[d]isplays con-
tamining abusive invective" are covered, id. at 2547, and concluded that this
selective proscription "create[d] the possibility that the city is seeking to
handicap the expression of particular ideas." Id. at 2549.
Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun, O'Connor and Stevens, agreed
with the judgment, but would hold the ordinance in violation of the First
Amendment because it is "fatally overbroad," criminalizing both protected and
unprotected speech. Id. at 2550 (White, J., concurring). Justice White objected
that the Court's approach placed fighting words on "equal constitutional
footing with political discourse and other forms of speech ... deemed to have
the greatest social value, [thus] . . . devalu[ing] the latter." Id. at 2554.
(White, J., concurring) (Stevens, J., did not join in this part of the opinion).
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices White and Blackmun declared that the
Court turned First Amendment law on its head, thus entitling fighting words
"greater protection than commercial speech-and possibly greater protection
than core political speech." Id. at 2564 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Finally, Justice Blackmun, writing alone, found the Court's decision dis-
heartening because it hampered the ability of society to cope with bias and
prejudice; he hoped it would be regarded as an aberration because of the
Court's strained use of settled doctrine. Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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That is precisely when the need for the First Amendment is the
greatest.
